Abstract. In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and has recently been re-formulated by Ray and Vohra (2015) . The farsighted stable set is based on a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional 'moves' in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually stands to gain. However, it does not require that each coalition make a maximal move, i.e., one that is not Pareto dominated (for the members of the coalition in question) by another. Consequently, when there are multiple continuation paths the farsighted stable set can yield unreasonable predictions. We restrict coalitions to hold common, history independent expectations that incorporate maximality regarding the continuation path. This leads to two related solution concepts: the rational expectations farsighted stable set (REFS) and the strong rational expectations farsighted stable set (SREFS). We apply these concepts to simple games and to pillage games to illustrate the consequences of imposing rational expectations for farsighted stability.
INTRODUCTION
Theories of coalitional stability are based on the notion of domination or objections by coalitions. A coalition is said to have an objection to the status-quo if it can change the outcome to one in which all its members gain. Perhaps the most widely used solution concept in this literature is the core: the set of outcomes to which there is no objection. The original formulation of the theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) , however, was concerned with a somewhat more sophisticated equilibrium concept, which they referred to simply as the "solution" but which has since become known as the vNM stable set. A vNM stable set consists of outcomes that satisfy two properties: (1) internal stability in the sense that no stable outcome dominates any other stable outcome; (2) external stability in the sense that every outcome not in the stable set is dominated by some stable outcome. There is a large literature on the stable set even though it has been notoriously difficult to work with.
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Both the core and the stable set are based on myopic, or one-shot, deviations by coalitions. If a change made by a coalition can be followed by other coalitional moves, then clearly we should require coalitions to be farsighted in their behavior. Each coalition should ask itself -"if we take action a, how will other coalitions react?". This is a direction of research that has attracted renewed interest; see, for example, Harsanyi (1974) , Aumann and Myerson (1988) , Chwe (1994) , Bloch (1996) , Vohra (1997, 1999) , Xue (1998) , Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) , Konishi and Ray (2003) , Herings et al. (2004 Herings et al. ( , 2009 ), Ray (2011) , Mauleon et al. (2011) , Vohra (2014, 2015) , Chander (2015) , Kimya (2015) . It is by no means obvious how the classical theory should be modified to account for farsightedness, which partly explains the diversity of approaches taken in this literature. Ray and Vohra (2014) distinguish between two principal approaches: (a) the blocking approach, which follows traditional cooperative game theory in abstracting away from the details of the negotiation process and relying on a coalitional game to specify what each coalition is able to accomplish on its own, and (b) the bargaining approach, which is based on noncooperative coalition bargaining and relies on specifying details such as a protocol that describes the order of moves. This paper studies farsightedness in the tradition of the blocking approach, with the underlying model described through a coalitional (or characteristic function) game. In particular, there is no pre-specified set of 'terminal' states, or a protocol specifying the order in which players or coalitions are allowed to move. Consequently, we cannot capture farsightedness through subgame perfection or some other solution concept based on backward induction. We nevertheless want to capture the idea that coalitional decision making is based not on the immediate effect of an initial 'move' but the 'final outcome '. 2 This immediately raises the question of how to determine what the 'final outcome' is in a sequence of coalitional moves (in a model without the formal apparatus of an extensive form game). Suppose coalition S 1 replaces x with y, and then S 2 replaces y with z. If z is the final outcome, and payoffs are realized only once, farsightedness would require S 1 to compare the utility of z to that of x and ignore its payoff at y. But this argument only works if z is known to be the 'final outcome'. What is considered to be a final outcome must, of course, also be stable. Thus, testing the stability of a particular outcome against a sequence of moves requires us to know which of the other outcomes are stable. This is precisely the kind of circularity that the stable set is very adept at handling, making it a fruitful vehicle for incorporating farsightedness within the blocking approach.
The idea of modifying the stable set by allowing for sequences of coalitional moves, with each coalition focused on the 'final outcome', goes back to Harsanyi (1974) . Unfortunately, the Harsanyi stable set, including it's more recent reformulation by Ray and Vohra (2015) , does not fully capture the idea of optimal behavior embodied in backward induction. One difficulty is that coalitions involved in a farsighted objection are not required to make the most profitable moves (in a Pareto sense) that may be available to them. This is the issue of maximality. For example, coalition S 1 might move from x to y, anticipating that S 2 will then move to z. If z is a 'final' outcome, and all players in S 1 prefer z to x, and all those in S 2 prefer z to y, then this would be considered a legitimate farsighted objection to x. But what if the move by S 2 to z is not maximal, in the sense that at y it has another available move, say to z , also a 'final' outcome, which is even better than z for all its members? It seems reasonable to require that if z and z are the only moves available to S 2 , then both S 2 and S 1 should focus on z rather than z as the final outcome. But the farsighted stable set does not insist on this.
Another feature of farsighted objections is that they permit coalitions to hold different beliefs about the continuation path of coalitional moves. For instance, it is possible that x is not in the farsighted stable set because S 1 replaces it with y, anticipating a second, and final, move to z while at the same time x is not stable because S 2 replaces it with y expecting the next, and final, move to be to z (not z). We refer to this as the issue of consistent beliefs. An alternative interpretation of this phenomenon is that rather than being inconsistent, beliefs are history dependent. Thus, agents may commonly believe that y will transition to z or z depending on whether y was preceded by x or x . In this paper we shall restrict beliefs to be consistent, or history independent, in the sense that the belief about the continuation from a given state does not depend on how the current state was reached. This corresponds to the Markovian assumption commonly made in dynamic models such as Konishi and Ray (2013) . In Sections 2 and 3 we provide several examples to explain these issues in more depth.
The main aim of this paper is to incorporate maximality and consistency (or history independence) of beliefs in the notion of farsighted stability while maintaining the parsimony of the blocking approach, i.e., without the introduction of a protocol or other details of the negotiation process.
3 In order to accomplish this, the only new concept that needs to be added to the traditional framework of coalitional games is that of an expectation function, a tool we borrow from Jordan (2006) . This describes the transition from one state to another, as well as the coalition which is supposed to effect the move. The expectation function represents the commonly held beliefs of all agents about the sequence of coalitional moves, if any, from every state. The use of a single expectation function immediately incorporates consistency or history independence. Of course, the coalition expected to move from one state to another must have the power as well as the incentive to do so. As we shall see, the explicit specification of an expectation function makes it possible to impose appropriate restrictions on it which serve to incorporate maximality. We consider two versions of maximality, one being stronger than another.
A state is said to be stationary if the expectation function prescribes no further move once this state is reached. The set of such stationary states then has an inherent element of stability. This leads us to define two related solution concepts: the rational expectations farsighted stable set (REFS) and the strong rational expectations farsighted stable set (SREFS). These are the set of stationary points of an expectation function satisfying one or the other notion of maximality as well as farsighted versions of internal and external stability. A key point of the paper is to show that although there are some cases in which farsighted stable sets, or even vNM stable sets, are REFS or SREFS, in general imposing rational expectations can be consequential for farsighted stability.
At some intuitive level, notions of farsightedness and maximality attempt to bring into coalitional games considerations that are similar to backward induction in noncooperative games. This will become clear in section 2, where we describe the framework and present a series of examples showing that the failure to impose maximality and consistency can lead to counterintuitive predictions. Because these examples have 'terminal nodes', allowing for backward induction, the connection between subgame perfection and maximality is obvious. 4 The difficulty, of course, is that coalitional games don't typically have the structure of an extensive form that allows for recursion.
5 And our main conceptual task is to formalize these ideas within the parsimony of the blocking approach (without introducing a protocol or other details about the negotiation process). We do so by incorporating an expectation function into the framework of coalitional games.
Section 3 contains formal definitions of an expectation function as well as the different versions of maximality and our solution concepts: REFS and SREFS. We show that one special but interesting case in which both these solution concepts coincide with the farsighted stable set is when the latter consists of states with a single payoff. However, this equivalence does not hold more generally. The following two Sections apply these concepts to a couple of important economic models, and illustrate how the imposition of rational expectations can result in predictions that are very different from those of existing versions of stable sets with farsighted players.
Section 4 provides an application to simple games, which have proved to be very useful in studying voting behavior and possess a rich literature on stable sets. We show that in this class of games, the farsighted stable sets identified in Ray and Vohra (2015) do not meet the consistency test. Or, if they do it is only by allowing beliefs to be history dependent. Moreover, the restriction to rational expectations, as in REFS or SREFS, leads to sharply different predictions regarding farsighted stability. For this class of games, the contrast between farsighted stable sets and REFS (or SREFS) seems to arise not from the maximality issue; it hinges entirely on the consistency issue. We also establish the existence of a SREFS in a large class of simple games. 4 More generally, the connection comes out perhaps most clearly in Kimya's (2015) concept of equilibrium coalitional behavior (ECB), which is defined for a model that has the advantage of being directly applicable to extensive form games.
5 Coalition proof Nash equilibrium in Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987) and equilibrium binding agreements in Ray and Vohra (1997) are able to make use of recursion by restricting attention to internal blocking, where each coalition in a sequence of objections is a subset of the previous one.
Section 5 studies pillage games. These are models of economies where property rights do not exist so that the more "powerful" can capture the assets or wealth of the less powerful. Jordan (2006) and Acemoglu et al. (2008) have studied farsighted cooperative behavior in these models.
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The application of our concepts to pillage games is complementary to the exercise in the previous Section. Here it is the maximality issue, rather than consistency, that turns out to make a crucial difference. In fact, in this model, the distinction between our two notions of maximality is also important; there exist REFS that are not SREFS. This is also the case for the Acemoglu et al. (2008) model of political power. Moreover, SREFS provides a new characterization of their equilibrium notion, while the notions of REFS or farsighted stable sets are not strong enough to yield precisely their solution.
MAXIMALITY AND CONSISTENCY
We consider a general setting, described by an abstract game, (N, X, E, u i (.)), where N is the set of players and X is the set of outcomes or states. Let N denote the set of all subsets of N . The effectivity correspondence, E : X × X → N , specifies the coalitions that have the ability to replace a state with another state: for x, y ∈ X, E(x, y) is the (possibly empty) set of coalitions that can replace x with y. Finally, u i (x) is the utility of player i at state x.
The set of outcomes as well as the effectivity correspondence will depend on the structure of the model being studied. For instance, in a coalition (or characteristic function) game, (N, V ), there is a set of feasible utilities, V (S), for every coalition S. 7 In this case, a state will generally refer to a coalition structure and a corresponding payoff allocation which is feasible and efficient for each of the coalitions in the coalition structure. Historically, however, following von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) , much of the literature has treated the set of states to be the set of imputations, the Pareto efficient utility profiles in V (N ), and implicitly assumed that S ∈ E(x, y) iff y S ∈ V (S). We explain below why this turns out to be unsatisfactory for studying farsightedness.
State y dominates x if there is S ∈ E(x, y) such that u S (y) u S (x). In this case we also say that (S, y) is an objection to x.
The core is the set of all states to which there is no objection.
A set K ⊆ X is a vNM stable set if it satisfies: (i) there do not exist x, y ∈ K such that y dominates x; internal stability.
(ii) for every x / ∈ K, there exists y ∈ K such that y dominates x; external stability.
For an abstract game, we define farsighted dominance as follows:
6 Piccione and Rubinstein (2007) study the analogue of an exchange economy in the "jungle", which is similar to a world without property rights. 7 A transferable utility, or TU, coalitional game will be denoted (N, v), where
State y farsightedly dominates x (under E) if there is a sequence y 0 , (y 1 , S 1 ), . . . , (y m , S m ), with y 0 = x and y m = y, such that for all k = 1, . . . m:
A set F ⊆ X is a farsighted stable set if:
(i) there do not exist x, y ∈ F such that y farsightedly dominates x; farsighted internal stability. (ii) for every x / ∈ F , there exists y ∈ F such that y farsightedly dominates x; farsighted external stability.
It is important to emphasize that the notion of effectivity is especially delicate in the context of farsightedness. Harsanyi (1974) , in defining farsighted dominance for a characteristic function game, maintained the von Neumann-Morgenstern assumption that S ∈ E(x, y) iff y S ∈ V (S).
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This way of specifying effectivity gives coalition S complete freedom in choosing y −S , the payoffs to outsiders (provided y is an imputation and y S ∈ V (S)). This obviously leads to the question of why or how coalition S can dictate the payoffs of coalition N − S. However, this questionable assumption has not received much attention until recently because it plays no role for myopic solutions such as the core and the stable set. But in the case of farsighted dominance this is not only conceptually questionable but can significantly alter the nature of the farsighted stable set, as shown by Ray and Vohra (2015) . They demonstrate that imposing reasonable restrictions on the effectivity correspondence results in a farsighted stable set that is very different from, and arguably more plausible than, that of Harsanyi (1974) . We will therefore need to be attentive to this issue when we consider specific models in Sections 4 and 5. Until then, in order to highlight the main concerns of this paper, we shall work in the generality of an abstract game, without any explicit restrictions on the effectivity correspondence.
The farsighted stable set is based on an optimistic view of the coalitions involved in a farsighted objection. A state is dominated if there exists some path that leads to a better outcome. Chwe (1994) proposed a farsighted solution concept based on conservative behavior, which is good at identifying states that cannot possibly be considered stable. A set K ⊆ X is consistent if K = {x ∈ X | for all y and S with S ∈ E(x, y), there exists z ∈ K such that z = y or z farsightedly dominates y and
Thus, any potential move from a point in a consistent set is deterred by some farsighted objection that ends in the set. Chwe shows that there exists one such set which contains all other consistent sets, and defines this to be the largest consistent set (LCS).
In general, both of these solution concepts are unsatisfactory because optimistic or pessimistic expectations are both ad hoc. Ideally, a solution concept should be based on optimal behavior (which may of course turn out to be optimistic or pessimistic in particular examples). The following examples, based on similar ones in Xue (1998), Herings et al. (2004) and Ray and Vohra (2014) , illustrate this problem vividly. EXAMPLE 1. The game is depicted in Figure 1 , Player 1 is effective in moving from state a to b, while player 2 can replace state b with either c or d, which are both 'terminal' states. The numbers below each state denote the utilities to the players. Both c and d belong to the farsighted stable set since they are terminal states. Since there is a farsighted objection from a to c, the former is not in the farsighted stable set. However, this is based on the expectation that player 2 will choose to replace b with c rather than d even though 2 prefers d to c. If 2 is expected to move, rationally, to d, then a should be judged to be stable, contrary to the prediction of the farsighted stable set. Note that a belongs to the LCS because of the possibility that the final outcome is d. So in this example the LCS makes a more reasonable prediction than the farsighted stable set. EXAMPLE 2. This is a modification of Example 1 as shown in Figure 2 . Now the optimal move for player 2 is to choose c rather than d. The LCS and farsighted stable set remain unchanged. But now it is the LCS which provides the wrong answer because player 1 should not fear that player 2 will (irrationally) choose d instead of c. In this example, the farsighted stable set makes a more reasonable prediction.
As the previous two examples show, both the LCS and the farsighted stable set suffer from the problem that they do not require coalitions (in these examples, player 2) to make moves that are maximal among all profitable moves. (A formal definition of maximality in our framework appears in the next Section).
Another problem that afflicts both the LCS and the farsighted stable set is that they may be based on expectations that are inconsistent in the sense that coalitions move based on different expectations about the continuation to follow. For the LCS this was pointed out by Konishi and Ray (2003) . Our next Example illustrates this problem for both the farsighted stable set and the LCS.
EXAMPLE 3. This is a three-player game with five states, shown in Figure 3 .
In this example, the farsighted stable set is {d, e} while the LCS is {a, b, d, e}. State a is not in the farsighted stable set because of a farsighted objection to e, and b is not in it because of a farsighted objection to d. However, from c player 3 can only move to either d or e. Thus, the exclusion of both a and b from the farsighted stable set is based on inconsistent expectations of the move from c. On the other hand, the inclusion of both a and b in the LCS is also based on inconsistent expectations. The 'right' answer in this example should be that {a, d, e} and {b, d, e} are two 'stable sets': the former if the expectation is that player 3 will move from c to d and the latter if the expectation is that 3 will move from c to e. Another interpretation of this phenomenon is that expectations under the farsighted stable set or the LCS allow for history dependence: the continuation from c depends on the history. In this sense what we are asking for can be seen as the joint requirement of consistency and history independence. Formally, in a dynamic model this corresponds to the Markovian assumption, which is commonly made in the literature, as in Konishi and Ray (2003) .
To define optimal behavior one will need to rely on players having (rational) expectations about the continuation path following any coalition move. In a dynamic setting, such as in Konishi and Ray (2003) or Ray and Vohra (2014) , these expectations are specified by a dynamic process of coalitional moves. An equilibrium process of coalition formation (EPCF) is a Markovian process in which coalitions take actions that are maximally profitable in terms of a value function.
9 One difference in these models is that Ray and Vohra (2014) , unlike Konishi and Ray (2003) , specify a protocol to explicitly determine the order in which coalitions are called upon to move at each stage. In spirit, though, in both cases the approach for incorporating consistency and rational expectations is similar to ours, even though we seek to accomplish this more directly within the static, blocking approach. Static models most closely related to our approach are Xue (1998) and Kimya (2015) . Xue (1998) argued that to resolve the maximality issue we should consider a stable set defined over paths of coalition actions rather than on outcomes. In many cases, such as Examples 1 and 2, this can resolve the problem. However, it may push the choice between optimism and pessimism to another level. When a path is tested against a deviation by a coalition, the deviation can itself lead to multiple stable paths and so in evaluating these multiple paths the pessimism/optimism choice resurfaces. This leads him to define the optimistic stable standard of behavior and the conservative stable standard of behavior. In Example 3, the predictions of these two concepts match the farsighted stable set and the LCS, respectively. We are able to avoid this by considering stability in terms of a given expectation that describes transitions from every outcome. In our framework, once a coalition makes a change, there is no further ambiguity about the continuation path. In this respect, our approach is similar to Konishi and Ray (2003) , Ray and Vohra (2014) and Kimya (2015) , even though these papers propose solution concepts that are not defined in terms of stable sets. In these papers an 'equilibrium path' need not involve all coalitions doing strictly better, whereas in our framework a sequence of coalition moves will be a farsighted objection, involving strict improvements; see Kimya (2015) for further discussion.
We should acknowledge that one reason all the examples in this Section are so simple is because they concern abstract games with terminal nodes. The skeptical reader might wonder whether issues of maximality or consistency are consequential in more general models of economic interest. Our analysis of simple games and pillage games in Sections 4 and 5 will demonstrate that these issues are indeed of more general importance. But we must first turn to the task of formally incorporating notions of maximality and consistency in a definition of farsightedness in coalitional games. Jordan (2006) formulates the idea that farsighted stability can be expressed in terms of commonly held consistent expectations regarding the 'final outcome' from any state. He defines an expectation as a function φ : X → X such that for every x ∈ X, φ(φ(x)) = φ(x). A stationary state of φ is x such that φ(x) = x. Given a farsighted stable set, Z, it is straightforward to construct an expectation φ that is consistent with farsighted dominance and yields Z as the collection of all stationary outcomes. If x ∈ Z, let φ(x) = x. If x / ∈ Z, let φ(x) = y for some y ∈ Z that farsightedly dominates x.
FARSIGHTEDNESS WITH RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
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In order to deal with the issues discussed in Section 2, we modify Jordan's approach by interpreting an expectation to describe the transition from one state to another, not necessarily the final outcome from a state. In addition, we will also find it important to keep track of the coalition that is expected to make the transition. With this in mind, we define an expectation as a function
, where f (x) is the state that is expected to follow x and S(x) ∈ E(x, f (x)) is the coalition expected to implement this change. If f (x) = x, S(x) = ∅, signifying the fact that no coalition is expected to change x. A stationary point of F is a state
An expectation is said to be absorbing if for every x ∈ X there exists k such that
We seek to describe a set of stable outcomes Z ⊆ X that is 'justified' by an expectation in the sense that Z is the set of stationary points of an expectation F that embodies farsighted rationality.
An absorbing expectation F is said to be a rational expectation if it has the following properties:
(I) If x is stationary, then from x no coalition is effective in making a profitable move (consistent with F ), i.e., there does not exist T ∈ E(x, y) such that u T (f * (y)) u T (x). (E) If x is a nonstationary state, then F (x) must prescribe a path that is profitable for all the coalitions that are expected to implement it, i.e., (x,
is a nonstationary state, then F (x) must prescribe an optimally profitable path for coalition S(x) in the sense that there does not exist y such that S(x) ∈ E(x, y) and
The set of stationary points, Σ(F ), of a rational expectation F is said to be a rational expectations farsighted stable set (REFS).
Conditions (I) and (E) are related but to not the same as farsighted internal and external stability (conditions (i) and (ii) in the definition of a farsighted stable set). And the differences can be significant enough to generate very different results, as we will see. Since Σ(F ) is a set of stationary states, Condition (I) clearly implies that Σ(F ) satisfies myopic internal stability in the traditional sense. It is weaker than farsighted internal stability since it requires internal stability only with respect to those farsighted objections that are consistent with the common expectation F .
Condition (E) states that to every x / ∈ Σ(F ) there is a farsighted objection (terminating in Σ(F )) consistent with the common expectation F . This is stronger than farsighted external stability since it requires consistency with F .
Condition (M) is the maximality condition; a translation of the corresponding condition of Konishi and Ray (2003) and Ray and Vohra (2014) into our framework. It requires that if S(x) is expected to move from x to f (x), then the final outcome resulting from this is not Pareto dominated for S(x) by some other move this coalition could have made. For instance, it would require that in Example 1 f (b) = d, and in Example 2 f (b) = c. Condition (M) is clearly a minimal requirement of optimality. It is also a sufficient expression of optimality if one takes the view that at a nonstationary state x, S(x) is the coalition that has the floor, which gives it the sole option to select a transition from x.
However, one could entertain models in which, under certain conditions, some other coalition may also have the right to intervene and change course. For instance, it may be possible for some subset of S(x) to thwart f (x) and move elsewhere. This motivates the following notion of strong maximality:
(M') If x is a nonstationary state, then F (x) must prescribe an optimally profitable path in the sense that no coalition has the power to change course and gain, i.e., there does not exist
Condition (M') strengthens (M) by allowing for the possibility that a coalition T which includes some players from S(x) is allowed to change the transition. This is based on the idea that a move by S(x) requires the unanimous consent of all its members, which means that another coalition may seize the initiative if it can enlist the support of at least one player in S(x).
A expectation F satisfying (I), (E) and (M') is a strong rational expectation. The set of stationary points of a strong rational expectation F is said to be a strong rational expectations farsighted stable set (SREFS).
Note that strong maximality continues to assume that a coalition disjoint from S(x) cannot interfere in the expected move. An even stronger notion of maximality would drop this assumption as well. While we do not pursue this here, see footnotes 11 and 15 below. We expect that these differences in maximality notions would get reflected in the details of the negotiation process embedded in any underlying noncooperative game that might explain a given notion of a farsighted stable set. An important direction for future work would be to carry forward the general Nash program to the study of stable sets, by studying noncooperative games that lead to one kind of stable set or another. Interestingly, Harsanyi (1974) can be viewed as one such exercise, showing that a (noncooperative) "equilibrium-point interpretation of stable sets" compels us to replace the dominance relation of von Neumann and Morgenstern with farsighted dominance.
Every SREFS is clearly a REFS. However, the converse is not true, as illustrated in the next couple of examples.
For the two-player game depicted in Figure 4 , consider F such that f (b) = d and S(x) = {1, 2}. Since S(x) gains in moving from b to d, and there is only one move available to this coalition, this is clearly a maximal move. If 1 anticipates that coalition {1, 2} will form and move to d, then 1 will move from a to b. So, the REFS corresponding to F is {c, d}. However, the move by {1, 2} from b to d is not strongly maximal because {2} could do even better by turning down this move and moving to c instead. In our language, F does not satisfy strong maximality, and so {c, d} is not a SREFS. A strongly maximal rational expectation, say F , must have the property that f (b) = c with S(b) = {2}. This will dissuade {1} from moving from a to b, ensuring that {a, c, d} is a SREFS, and of course also a REFS. On the other hand, {c, d} is a REFS but not a SREFS. In Section 5 we will see a more general version of this phenomenon.
Our next example shows that condition (M') of SREFS may be too demanding for existence, even though a REFS may exist.
There are three possible rational expectation functions prescribing moves from a to one of b, c or d. All of them satisfy maximality. Of course, for each of these expectation functions, all three terminal states are stationary. So, in each case, {b, c, d} is a REFS. However, none of these expectation functions satisfies strong maximality. For instance, consider F such that f (a) = b and S(a) = {1, 2}. This does not satisfy strong maximality since 2 can join with 3 to move to c, a terminal state. The same argument applies to the other two rational expectation functions. So, there is no expectation function for which the set {b, c, d} is a SREFS. On the other hand, {a, b, c, d} cannot be a SREFS because it would violate (I). So, there is no SREFS in this example.
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In general, even the existence of a REFS is not guaranteed. One example in which this is the case is the three-player NTU 'roommate game' depicted in Figure 6 . EXAMPLE 6. From every state there is one two-player coalition that gains by moving to another state.
It is easy to see that this games possesses no vNM stable set, no farsighted stable stable and no REFS.
Fortunately, the failure of existence seen in Examples 5 and 6 does not extend to the applications we consider in Sections 5 and 6. There we are able to establish the existence of SREFS under some mild conditions. Apart from showing existence, the main theme of these Sections is that REFS or SREFS can be very different from farsighted stable sets (Section 4) and REFS can be very different from SREFS (Section 5). However, there is one interesting case in which a SREFS (or REFS) coincides with a farsighted stable set.
A set of states Z is a single-payoff set if u(x) = u(y) for all x, y ∈ Z. THEOREM 1. If Z is a single-payoff REFS it is a SREFS and a farsighted stable set. Conversely, if Z is a single-payoff farsighted stable, then it is a SREFS.
All proofs are provided in the Appendix. REMARK 1. Consider a characteristic function game in which the interior of the core is nonempty. Then, by Theorem 2 of Ray and Vohra (2015) , every state with a payoff in the interior of the core is a single-payoff farsighted stable set. By Theorem 1, all such games possess a SREFS.
SIMPLE GAMES
In this Section, we study the class of monotonic, proper simple games (see von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) ). These are games that have the following properties for each coalition S
The set of efficient payoff allocations, or imputations, in any such game is the nonnegative ndimensional unit simplex, . A coalition S such that v(S) = 1 is called a winning coalition. Let W denote the set of all winning coalitions. For simplicity, assume that no i ∈ N is a dummy player; that is each i belongs to at least one minimal winning coalition.
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A player i is called a veto player if i is a member of every winning coalition; that is, i ∈ W for every W ∈ W. The collection of all veto players, also known as the collegium, is denoted C = ∩ S∈W S. A collegial game is one in which C = ∅. The collegium (and the corresponding game) will be called oligarchic if C is itself a winning coalition. Note that in the absence of dummy players an oligarchic game is one in which C = N ; it is a pure bargaining game, in which the grand coalition is the only winning coalition.
In a simple game, a state x specifies a coalition structure, denoted π(x), and an associated payoff, u(x), such that i∈W (x) u i (x) = 1, where W (x) is the winning coalition (if any) in π(x). We use X 0 to denote the set of states where no winning coalition forms and so u i = 0 for all i. States in X 0 are called zero states.
We will show that under certain conditions all such games possess a SREFS. Moreover, the consistency of expectations underlying SREFS makes the structure of these sets very different from the farsighted stable sets identified in Ray and Vohra (2015) We make the following assumption regarding the effectivity correspondence. Assumption 1. The effectivity correspondence satisfies the following restrictions:
(a) For every x ∈ X, S ⊆ N and u ∈ R S + with i∈S u i = v(S), there is y ∈ X such that S ∈ E(x, y) and u(y) S = u.
12 The proof of our main result in this Section can be easily modified to accommodate the presence of dummy players.
Condition (a) states that every coalition can form and divide its worth in any way among its members. Condition (b) states that when a coalition S forms it does not affect any coalition that is disjoint from it, and if it includes some members of a coalition, then the residual remains intact. This is a natural way to describe the immediate change in the coalition structure resulting from the formation of a coalition. Condition (c) requires that if with the formation of T the residual in W (x) remains winning, then the players in W (x) − T cannot lose. 13 It includes the condition that if W (x) ∩ T = ∅, then u(x) = u(y). Conditions (b) and (c) should be interpreted as natural restrictions that prevent a coalition from reorganizing the payoffs or coalition structure of those outside it. We have mentioned earlier the pitfalls of not imposing such restrictions in the context of farsighted solution concepts.
In an oligarchic game, any strictly positive payoff is in the interior of the core. By Remark 1, any state with a strictly positive payoff, along with coalition N , is a SREFS. In the remainder of this Section, therefore, we shall concentrate on non-oligarchic games.
We discuss in detail an example which illustrates one of the main themes of this section -namely the difference between REFS or SREFS and the farsighted stable set in simple games. Ray and Vohra (2015) show that under Assumption 1, every farsighted stable in this game assigns a fixed payoff to the veto player, strictly between 0 and 1, while the remaining surplus can be divided in any way among players 2 and 3. More precisely, for every a ∈ (0, 1), there is a farsighted stable set Z a with the set of payoffs: {u ∈ R 3 + | u 1 = a, u 2 + u 3 = 1 − a}; see Figure  7 , where the vertices of the simplex denote states at which the entire surplus is allocation to one of the three players.
However, no set of the form Z a can be a REFS because the external stability of Z a (in the sense of a farsighted stable set) relies on inconsistent expectations. To see this, consider why the allocation u is not in Z a . There is first an objection by {2, 3}, resulting in the coalition structure {{1}, {2, 3}} and 0 payoff to all players. Call this state x 0 . This is followed by a move by N to a point in A. And u is not stable because there is first a move by {2, 3} to x 0 , followed by a move by N to a point in B. In the first case, x 0 is expected to be replaced by a point in A, while in the second case it is expected to be replaced by a point in B. This is precisely the kind of 'inconsistent' expectation that must be ruled out in a REFS or SREFS. In other words, a farsighted stable set in this example cannot be a REFS.
We now show that in this Example there is a SREFS, Z, consisting of a finite set of states: Z = {(u 1 , π 1 ), (u 2 , π 2 ), (u 3 , π 3 )}, where for some a ∈ (0, 1) and b ≡
(1−a) 2 ,
13 Of course, this also implies that W (x) − T ∈ π(y). Condition (b) goes beyond this because it also applies to residuals that are not winning. • u 2 = (a + b, b, 0), π 2 = {{1, 2}, {3}}.
• u 3 = (a + b, 0, b), π 3 = {{1, 3}, {2}}.
The three imputations corresponding to Z are shown in Figure 8 . To sustain Z as SREFS, we construct an expectation described by the following rules. In what follows, we write x = (u, π) and This describes F for all x ∈ X.
Clearly, F satisfies (I) and (E). To check (M'), note that in all states in Z players 2 and 3 get either b or 0. This implies strong maximality in cases (ii) and (iii). The deviations in (iv) and (v) are strongly maximal since 1 gets a + b, her highest possible payoff in Z. In case (vi), (M') is satisfied because players 2 and 3 have no reason to move, which means that player 1 does not possess a farsighted objection that could end up at x 2 or x 3 .
This completes the demonstration that Z is a SREFS.
4.2. The Main Theorem. In more general non-oligarchic games Ray and Vohra (2015) show that it is possible to construct a farsighted stable set in which veto players, and perhaps some others, receive a fixed payoff while the remainder of the surplus is shared in any arbitrary way among the remaining players. Such sets, known as discriminatory stable sets, also played an important role in vNM stable set theory, though with the rather important difference that in vNM stable sets it is non-veto players who received a fixed payoff. In contrast, SREFS do not seem to have the structure of discriminatory stable sets. Instead, in most cases SREFS yield finite payoff sets. We have of course already observed this in Example 7, but this is also the more general conclusion that emerges from the proof of our next result.
Although the notion of a farsighted stable set does not impose maximality, in non-oligarchic simple games this property does seem to hold. In this model, therefore, the difference between farsighted stable sets and SREFS seems to stem from consistency and history independence.
For most simple games we have been able to constructively prove the existence of a SREFS. There is, however, one particular case for which existence has proven to be elusive. This is the case in which there is a three-player minimal winning coalition with precisely one veto player. Our existence result will apply whenever there are two or more veto players or whenever the size of a minimal winning coalition exceeds three. We do need to make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. There does not exist a three-player minimal winning coalition with precisely one veto player.
Subject to this assumption we are able to construct a SREFS for all collegial games.
THEOREM 2. A SREFS exists in every non-oligarchic collegial game satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2.
Can Assumption 2 can be dispensed with or will this case yield an example in which SREFS does not exist? As of now this question remains open.
Of course, a large class of simple games do not have any veto player, the simplest example being the majority game in which any majority of players constitutes a winning coalition. von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) identified a class of constant-sum games that have a vNM stable set known as a main simple solution. Suppose there is a ∈ N + such that i∈S a i = 1 for every minimal winning coalition S. Define, for each minimal winning coalition S, u S to be the imputation such that u S i = a i for all i ∈ S and u S i = 0 otherwise. If the game is a constantsum game, then the set of all such imputations is a vNM stable set, known as the main simple solution. For instance, the imputation (0.5, 0.5, 0) and its permutations constitute a main simple solution in the three-person majority game. It can be shown that the set of states corresponding to a main simple solution is a SREFS.
Suppose U is a main simple solution with associated vector a ∈ N + . Let Z(U ) = {x ∈ X | u(x) ∈ U }. We claim that Z(U ) is a SREFS. Since U is a vNM stable set, for every x / ∈ Z(U ) there is S ⊆ N and y ∈ Z(U ) such that S ∈ E(x, y) and u S (y) u S (x). For every x / ∈ Z(U ) pick any (S, y) with this property and set F (x) = (y, S). If there are several such (S, y) pick one arbitrarily. For every x ∈ Z(U ), let f (x) = x. Clearly, F is an expectation that satisfies (E). Suppose it does not satisfy (I). Then there is x ∈ Z(U ) and T ∈ E(x, y) such that u T (f * (y)) u T (x). Let S be the minimal winning coalition such that u(x) = u S . Since u i (x) = a i for all i ∈ S, no i ∈ S can get a higher payoff at any other state in Z(U ), which implies that S ∩ T = ∅. Of course, S must be contained in the winning coalition at x. By Assumption 1 (c), u S (y) = u S (x) = a S , i.e., y ∈ Z(U ) and therefore f * (y) = y. But then
, with y ∈ Z(U ), which contradicts the myopic internal stability of U . Thus, F satisfies (I). It clearly satisfies strong maximality, (M'), because if any S gains by moving from x to y ∈ Z(U ), then u i (y) = a i for all i ∈ S and there is no other y ∈ Z(U ) such that u i (y ) > u i (y) for any i ∈ S.
PILLAGE GAMES
In this Section we show that in pillage games, in contrast to simple games, maximality and strong maximality rather than consistency play a crucial role in identifying farsighted stability. In Jordan's (2006) model of 'wealth is power' we find that there is an important distinction between REFS and SREFS, both of which can be different from the vNM stable set or the farsighted stable set. In the Acemoglu et al. (2008) model of political power we see another interesting illustration of the difference between REFS and SREFS. Acemoglu et al. (2008) propose the unique ruling coalition (URC) as a solution concept and characterize it both through axioms as well as the subgame perfect equilibrium of a noncooperative model of coalition formation. In this model, REFS coincide with farsighted stable sets and include the URC. But they generally include other outcomes as well. We show that SREFS provides just the refinement of REFS that yields precisely the URC. Hence SREFS provide a new characterization of the URC.
In a pillage game, a coalition can appropriate the resources of any other coalition that has less power. Given a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, the set of wealth allocations is , the unit simplex in R n . We shall consider the class of pillage games in which 'wealth is power': the power of coalition S is simply its aggregate wealth. Given wealth allocations w and w let L(w, w ) = {i ∈ N | w i < w i } denote the set of players who lose in moving from w to w . We define the effectivity correspondence in this model as follows:
14
(1)
S ∈ E(w, w ) if and only if i∈S w i > i∈L(w,w ) w i and w i = w i for all i / ∈ S ∪ L(w, w ).
This expresses the notion that a coalition can pillage another only if its power is strictly greater than that of the victims. Moreover, only the winners' and losers' wealth payoffs can be affected through the act of pillaging. That is, if j is neither amongst those who have been pillaged nor part of the coalition that changes w to w , then w j = w j . This last condition rules out a pillaging coalition sharing its spoils with others. While this condition is of no consequence for myopic notions of stability, it becomes important in the context of farsighted stability. As we have remarked earlier, it makes no sense to allow a deviating coalition to affect the distribution of the payoff of outsiders. This is illustrated in Example 8 below, where a gift can turn out to be hazardous to the recipients -a Trojan horse. We shall therefore assume throughout this Section that the effectivity correspondence is defined by (1).
Given the effectivity function, notions of the core, myopic and farsighted stable set, REFS, SREFS remain unchanged.
By way of background, it will be useful to begin with Jordan's analysis of the (myopic) vNM stable set.
A number a ∈ [0, 1] is said to be dyadic if a = 0 or a = 2 −k for some nonnegative integer k. For every positive integer k let D k = {w ∈ | w i is dyadic for every i and if
The set of all dyadic allocations is D = ∪ k D k . The set of all allocations in which one player captures the entire surplus, D 0 , is the set of tyrannical allocations. Of course, all such allocations are in the core. It is easy to see that the only other allocations in the core are ones in which two players share the surplus equally. In other words, the core is D 1 .
Jordan (2006) provides the following characterization of the stable set. While the latter is not in the stable set, it allows player 1 to then pillage 3 and achieve the tyrannical allocation (1, 0, 0), which is stable. In other words, (1, 0, 0) is a farsighted objection to (0.5, 0.25, 0.25). Note that if player 3 anticipates the second step in this move, she should not remain neutral when player 1 pillages 2. Jordan (2006) formalizes this idea by explicitly introducing expectations. He shows that if otherwise neutral players act in accordance with the expected (final) outcome, then the stable set, D, is indeed stable in a farsighted sense.
However, Jordan's analysis does not really conform to a framework in which the effectivity correspondence specifies which coalition(s) are effective in changing a current state w k−1 to w k , independently of where w k will end up. For instance, in the three-player example, whether player 1 is effective in changing the allocation (0.5, 0.25, 0.25) to (0.75, 0, 0.25) cannot depend on any further changes that may be expected to take place. What is the farsighted stable set if we adopt the effectivity correspondence specified in (1)? As our next result shows, it turns out to be identical to D 1 , the core.
THEOREM 4. Suppose the effectivity correspondence is defined as in (1). Then the unique farsighted stable set is D 1 , the core.
We now turn to a consideration of SREFS and REFS in this model. Dyadic allocations in which players with positive wealth share equally will play an important role in this analysis. For every nonnegative integer k, let B k = {x ∈ | x i = 0 or x i = 2 −k , ∀i} and B = ∪ k B k . Note that B 0 is the set of tyrannical allocations and B 0 ∪ B 1 = D 1 .
Our next Example will illustrate a crucial difference between REFS and SREFS in this model. The core, or D 1 = B 0 ∪ B 1 , in this example is the set of all permutations of allocations of the form (1, 0, 0, 0) and (0.5, 0.5, 0, 0). Since B 2 consists of the equal-division allocation,w = (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25), B = D 1 ∪ {w}. It is easy to see, that there can be no further pillaging from any allocation in D 1 . So, every REFS, and therefore every SREFS, contains D 1 . In fact, D 1 is a REFS and so is B, but only the latter is a SREFS. Theorems 5 and 6 provide general existence results for REFS and SREFS, respectively. But the four-player case is useful for illustrating the difference between REFS and SREFS.
For the four-player game, consider an expectation function F such that Σ(F ) is a SREFS. As we have already observed, D 1 ⊆ Σ(F ). We will now argue that this inclusion is strict by showing thatw ∈ Σ(F ). Observe that if w is such that only two players have positive worth, unless they are equal, F must specify that the more powerful pillage the weaker one to end up at a tyrannical allocation. Now consider w such that three players have positive wealth and one has zero wealth. Without loss of generality, suppose w 1 ≥ w 2 ≥ w 3 > 0 and w 4 = 0. We now describe why w / ∈ Σ(F ). There are two distinct cases: Case 1. Suppose w = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0). Any two of the first three players can pillage the remaining player with positive wealth to provide 0.5 to each member of the coalition, which is stable. Since the only possible act of pillage at w must come from a two-player coalition, any such move satisfies strong maximality. Thus f (w) must be of the form, f i (w) = f j (w) = 0.5 for i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Case 2. Suppose w 1 ≥ w 2 > w 3 > w 4 = 0. If 1 pillages 3 he becomes more powerful than 2 and we know that F must then predict the tyrannical allocation (1, 0, 0, 0). Since 1 ends up with the entire surplus, the move by 1 to pillage 3 is strongly maximal. This establishes that w / ∈ Σ(F ) and that S(w) = {1} is one possibility for the coalition that is expected to move at w. If w 1 = w 2 , or if w 1 = 0.5 and w 2 > w 3 , then S(w) = {2} would be another possibility. But, and this will be crucial for our arguments to follow, a strongly maximal F rules out the possibility that S(w) = {1, 2}. While {1, 2} can pillage 3, maximality demands that there be no further change. Otherwise one of the two players in {1, 2} would not have made a profitable move in the first place. Thus S(w) = {1, 2} must mean that f (w) = (0.5, 0.5, 0, 0). While this would be maximal for {1, 2}, it would violate strong maximality since player 1 would have done even better by pillaging player 3 on her own to move to (w 1 + w 3 , w 2 , 0, 0) and then to (1, 0, 0, 0). (We saw a similar phenomenon in Example 4). Thus, strong maximality implies that either S(w) = {1} or S(w) = {2}.
15 For concreteness, consider w = (0.375, 0.375, 0.25, 0). It is a maximal move for {1, 2} to pillage 3 and move to (0.5, 0.5, 0, 0). But this is not strongly maximal. For F to satisfy strong maximality one of the stronger players must pillage 3 on her own and end up with the entire surplus.
It is now easy to see thatw ∈ Σ(F ). The only possible acts of pillage atw are for a three-player coalition to pillage the fourth player or for a two-player coalition to pillage one of the remaining players. The former cannot be consistent with F because we have already shown that if only three players have positive wealth there must be a further act of pillage, resulting in one of the three players in the original move to eventually lose. The latter is also ruled out because, as we have shown in the previous paragraph, strong maximality will lead to a tyrannical outcome; one of the two players will eventually lose. This completes the proof thatw ∈ Σ(F ) and Σ(F ) = D 1 .
To complete the proof that B = Σ(F ), consider any allocation w =w such that all 4 players have positive wealth. Without loss of generality, let w 1 ≥ w 2 ≥ w 3 ≥ w 4 > 0 , with w 1 > w 4 . It follows that w 1 + w 2 > 0.5. It is sufficient to show that w cannot be stationary under F . If w 1 < 0.5, then w 2 < 0.5 as well, and {1, 2} can pillage players 3 and 4 to arrive at the stable allocation (0.5, 0.5, 0, 0). By internal stability, this implies that w / ∈ Σ(F ). If w 1 ≥ 0.5, since w 1 > w 4 > 0, player 1 can pillage player 4 to move to (w 1 +w 4 , w 2 , w 3 , 0), where w 1 +w 4 > 0.5 and w 1 + w 4 > w 2 . Now it is easy to see that f * (w 1 + w 4 , w 2 , w 3 , 0) = (1, 0, 0, 0). This means that 1's move to pillage 4 is strongly maximal. By internal stability, this must again imply that w / ∈ Σ(F ).
Matters are quite different as far as REFS are concerned. It is possible to construct a rational expectations function F such that Σ(F ) = D 1 is a REFS. The construction of F (see the proof of Theorem 5 for details) has the property that from every unequal allocation the most powerful pillages a least powerful player, and this leads sequentially to a tyrannical allocation. The only remaining issue is to define F in such a way thatw = (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25) is rendered unstable. This can be done by defining F such that:
(i) f (w) = (0.375, 0.375, 0.25, 0) ≡ w with S(w) = {1, 2}. That is, players 1 and 2 jointly pillage player 4 and dividew 4 equally. (ii) f (w ) = f * (w ) = (0.5, 0.5, 0, 0) with S(w ) = {1, 2}. Here, players 1 and 2 pillage player 3 and share w 3 equally.
Note that atw or w if {1, 2} did not divide their gains equally, at the next stage the more powerful of the two will pillage the remaining player(s) and obtain her tyrannical allocation. Thus, the less powerful of the two would not have joined in the act of pillage. This means that f (w) and f (w ) describe a maximal move by {1, 2} in the sense of Condition (M). It is now easy to see that D 1 is a REFS. But as we've already seen, it cannot be a SREFS.
We now turn to existence for the general case of an arbitrary number of players. For any positive integer n, let k(n) be the largest integer such that 2 k ≤ n.
B k and is therefore the largest REFS identified by Theorem 5. And there are many others, including the unique farsighted stable set: B 0 ∪ B 1 = D 1 . In this model, therefore, unlike simple games, the farsighted stable set can be justified on the basis of consistent and rational expectations. It does not, however, meet the strong maximality test, as shown by Example 8. In other words, Theorem 5 cannot be strengthened to assert that ∪ k * 0 B k is a SREFS for all k > 0. However, as our next result shows (formalizing the message from Example 8), one of the REFS identified in Theorem 5 is a SREFS. THEOREM 6. Suppose the effectivity correspondence is as in (1). Then B is a SREFS.
We close this section with a discussion of Acemoglu et al. (2008) . They study a model of political coalition formation in which the power of each player is exogenously given. For each i ∈ N , γ i > 0 denotes i's political power. The power of coalition S is γ S = i∈S γ i . Coalition S ⊆ T is winning in T if γ S > αγ T , where α ∈ [0.5, 1). Denote by W(T ) the set of subsets of T that are winning in T . If such a coalition exercises its power, it captures the entire surplus and becomes the ruling coalition. The other players are eliminated and play no further role. However, the ruling coalition may itself be subject to a new round of power grab from within.
The distribution of wealth is determined through an exogenous rule that depends only on the identity of the ruling coalition. Assume that for every player it is better to be in a ruling coalition than not. Moreover, it is better to be in a ruling coalition with lower aggregate power. As Acemoglu et al. (2008) point out, a particular example of such a rule, which we adopt for the sake of simplicity, is the following:
A state can now be defined as the ruling coalition: at state S, the ruling coalition is S and the wealth distribution is w(S). The set of states is therefore N . Winning coalitions are the ones effective in changing a state:
S) if and only if S is winning in T .
This means that if a change occurs, the new ruling coalition is smaller. If such a change is expected to lead to a further change, then a winning coalition will choose not to exercise its power. This is a result of the fact that any further change must leave some member(s) of the original winning coalition with a payoff of 0. In other words, if there is a farsighted objection S, S 1 , . . . S m leading from S to S m it must be the case that m = 1; farsighted dominance is equivalent to dominance. 16 Harsanyi (1974) refers to a farsighted dominance relation with this property as trivial and points out that if this property holds for every farsighted dominance of one state over another, then the vNM stable set is equivalent to the farsighted stable set.
Another feature of this model that makes it very tractable is that objections can only come from subsets of the ruling coalition (internal blocking). This makes it possible to construct a stable set recursively. Of particular interest in these models is the stability of N , or the stable state(s) starting from N . We illustrate this through the following example. A vNM stable set can be constructed as follows. Any ruling coalition consisting of one individual clearly belongs to the stable set (it is in the core). Any ruling coalition consisting of two players is not in the stable set because the more powerful player will eliminate the weaker one; there is an objection leading to a stable state. Next, consider the three-player coalitions. The coalition {1, 2, 4} is not stable because player 4 has enough power to eliminate the other two. Let the collection of the other three-player coalitions be denoted S = {{1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3}}. It is easy to see that no coalition in S is threatened by a single powerful player. In each instance, two of the players have enough power to eliminate the third, but the resulting outcome is not stable, as we have just noted. This means that all coalitions in S are stable, and N is not; it will be replaced by one of these three-player coalitions. Thus, the stable set consists of singletons and the collection S. In fact, this is also a farsighted stable set because farsighted dominance is equivalent to myopic dominance in this model. To verify this directly in this Example, it is only necessary to establish the farsighted internal stability for states in S. While two players could eliminate a third, this cannot result in a farsighted objection ending in a stable state because the weaker of the two will get eliminated at the next stage. We conclude that N is not stable and will replaced be one of the coalitions in S.
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Recall that farsighted internal stability is stronger than Condition (I) of REFS and myopic external stability is stronger than Condition (E) of REFS. Consequently, the equivalence of farsighted dominance and myopic dominance also yields equivalence with REFS. More precisely, consider a set of states Z that is a stable set as well as a farsighted stable set. For every state S ∈ Z, let F (S) = S. (Because X = N , we abuse notation slightly to consider F as a function from N → N ). For S / ∈ Z define F (S) to be a subcoalition of S that dominates it (myopically) and belongs to Z. If there are several such coalitions, pick one arbitrarily. By construction, F satisfies (E). It satisfies (I) because Z is farsighted stable set. Finally, it satisfies (M) because for every nonstationary state, S, it prescribes a move by coalition F (S) that ends with F (S). Since this is the only profitable move available to F (S) it is trivially maximal. Acemoglu et al. (2008) provide an axiomatic characterization of a solution to this model, which they refer to as the unique ruling coalition (URC), and also show that it coincides with the subgame perfect equilibria of a noncooperative model of coalition formation. The URC is a refinement of REFS, or the stable set. This difference turns out to hinge on the difference between REFS and SREFS. In fact, in this model SREFS refines REFS precisely to the URC. 18 This can be illustrated through Example 9. As explained above, in constructing a rational expectation F we have the freedom to choose F (N ) to be any one of the three coalitions in S. In particular, we could define F (N ) = {2, 3, 4}. But players 3 and 4 could do better by forming {1, 3, 4}; recall that the payoff to a player is higher in a coalition with lower aggregate power. In other words, F does not satisfy (M'). In fact, strong maximality in this model, not just in Example 9, reduces to the condition that if S is not a stationary state, then F (S) has the lowest aggregate power among all stable coalitions that are winning in S:
If γ is generic in the sense that γ S = γ T for any S, T , S = T , then clearly F (S) is unique for every S. And the unique strong rational expectation can be computed recursively as follows. Of course, F (S) = S if |S| = 1. Suppose F (S) has been defined for all S such that |S| < k. Then for S with |S| = k,
is the same as φ(S), the Acemoglu et al. (2008) notion of the URC for player set S. Thus we have yet another characterization of the URC: it is the unique SREFS. In this model, the farsighted stable set or REFS generally yields a set of outcomes that strictly includes the URC. Strong maximality refines it precisely to the URC.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper provides a framework for the analysis of cooperative solution concepts that combines farsightedness with the principles underlying the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets. We go beyond the recent work of Ray and Vohra (2015) by restricting coalitional moves to be maximal. We do so under the assumption that all coalitions hold common or consistent beliefs about the continuation path of future coalitional moves. Another interpretation of consistency is history independence -future moves from any state are independent of previous moves culminating in the current state. An interesting avenue for future research would be to incorporate maximality without assuming history independence.
We model consistency through the use of an expectation function, which describes the transition from one state to another as well as the coalition which makes the move. Analogs of internal and external stability that define a stable set are easily incorporated in this framework. These, and two versions of maximality then give rise to two different solution concepts -the rational expectations farsighted stable set (REFS) and the strong rational expectations farsighted stable set (SREFS).
In a series of examples, we show that these solution concepts lead to predictions which are intuitively more appealing than the Chwe largest consistent set or the Ray-Vohra farsighted stable set. However, Theorem 1 identifies one situation where SREFS, REFS and the farsighted stable set coincide. This is the case in which there is a unique payoff at all states in the farsighted stable set. As shown in Ray and Vohra (2015) , any payoff in the interior of the core of a characteristic function game can be identified as such a farsighted stable set. According to Theorem 1 it is also a SREFS.
We apply our solution concepts to two broad classes of games. The first is the class of proper simple games. We prove constructively that under a mild assumption all game with veto players have a non-empty SREFS. SREFS turns out to be quite different from the farsighted stable set identified by Ray and Vohra (2015) , the main driving for the difference being consistency. Our second application is for the class of pillage games, first studied by Jordan (2006) to analyze cooperative situations without well defined property rights over resources. We show that both REFS and SREFS exist for all such games. Again, these solution concepts turn out to make predictions which are quite different from that made by the farsighted stable set. In this case, the main driving force for the difference is maximality. In this model there is also an important difference between REFS and SREFS.
Finally, we show that SREFS provides another characterization of the ultimate ruling coalition, a solution concept advanced by Acemoglu et al. (2008) in their analysis of political coalition formation.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1.
Suppose Z is a single-payoff REFS. Since all stationary states have the same payoff, Z is clearly also a SREFS and satisfies farsighted internal stability in the definition of a farsighted stable set. Moreover, Condition (E) implies farsighted external stability in the definition of a farsighted stable set. Thus Z is a farsighted stable set.
To prove the second part of the Theorem, consider a single-payoff farsighted stable set X 0 . Define X 1 to be the set of states from which there is a farsighted objection to some state in X 0 in a single step. More precisely:
Since X 0 is a farsighted stable set, from every x ∈ X −X 0 , there is a farsighted objection leading to some x 0 ∈ X 0 : x, (x 1 , S 1 ), . . . , (x , S ), (x m , S m ). Clearly x ∈ X 1 , which establishes the nonemptiness of X 1 . We shall now recursively define subsets of X from which there are farsighted objections leading to X 0 in a minimal number of steps. All of these sets will be disjoint and will cover X. The construction is as follows.
Suppose X j have been defined for all j = 1, . . . , k. Define X k+1 to be the set of all other states from which there is a farsighted objection leading to X 0 such that the first step is a state in X k :
with x 1 ∈ X k and x m ∈ X 0 }.
To complete the proof we will construct a function F : X → X × N where F (x) = (f (x), S(x)) such that f (x 0 ) = x 0 for every x 0 ∈ X 0 , and for every x ∈ X k+1 , f (x) ∈ X k . We know that from x ∈ X k+1 there is a farsighted objection leading to some state in X 0 which proceeds by first moving to a point in X k . We will choose f (x) as one such point along with a unique coalition that initiates such a farsighted objection. The function F is constructed recursively. For x ∈ X 1 , define f (x) = x 0 ∈ X 0 and S(x) to be a coalition that has a one step objection from x to x 0 . If there are multiple such coalitions, choose one arbitrarily. This describes a unique transition from X 1 to X 0 . Having defined F : X j → X j−1 × N for all j = 1, . . . k, if X k+1 = ∅, for x ∈ X k+1 let S 1 be a coalition that has a farsighted objection from x to x m ∈ X 0 , denoted x, (x 1 , S 1 ), . . . , (x m , S m ), such that x 1 ∈ X k . Let F (x) = (x 1 , S 1 ). Note that there may be multiple such farsighted objections. In that case, pick F (x) to be the first element of any such sequence. Proceeding in this way, we have constructed a function F : X → X ×N with X 0 as its set of stationary points. It remains to be shown that F is a strong rational expectation.
Since the stationary points of F have the same payoff vector, it trivially satisfies Condition (I) in the definition of a rational expectation.
To prove Condition (E), consider x ∈ X − X 0 . Of course, there is some k ≥ 0 such that x ∈ X k+1 . From the construction of F we know that there exists a farsighted objection from x to x m ∈ X 0 , say, x, (
(There is no presumption that (x 2 , S 2 ) = F 2 (x), or that m = k). Let u 0 denote the (common) payoff corresponding to each of the (single-payoff) states in X 0 . Obviously,
, which implies that S 1 gains in moving along the path (x, F (x), F 2 (x), . . . , F k (x)). By the same reasoning, S 2 also gains by moving from f (x) along the path (F 2 (x) , . . . , F k (x)), and so on for all S j , j = 1, . . . S k . Thus,
To see that Condition (M') is satisfied note that no player, and therefore no coalition, can gain by deviating from the path prescribed by F because any deviation leads to the same payoff vector, u 0 . This establishes Condition (M') and completes the proof that F is a strong rational expectation with Σ(F ) = Z.
The proof of Theorem 2 will make use of the following lemma. (1) For every J ∈ J , C ∪J is a minimal winning coalition, b J 0 and j∈J b j = ≡ 1−d|C|.
(2) There does not exist a winning coalition C ∪ T such that j∈T b j < .
Proof. Let J = {J ⊂ N − C | C ∪ J is a minimal winning coalition}. Without loss of generality, assume that the coalitions in J = {J 1 , . . . , J K } are ranked in non-decreasing order of cardinality, so |J k | ≤ |J k+1 | for all k = 1, . . . , K − 1.
Choose ∈ (0, 1) such that < |C| . We will now construct an algorithm which will yield b and J ⊆ J satisfying the desired properties.
Let J f , f > 1, be the first coalition in J which has a non-empty intersection with some J k , k < f . If no such f exists, then set f = K + 1, and J K+1 = ∅.
Step 1:
so this construction is well-defined. Clearly, b and J k satisfy Condition (1) of the Lemma for all k < f . Moreover, since the coalitions in J are in non-decreasing order of cardinality:
k=1 J k . Then, for every i ∈ A 1 , b i as defined above will be the "terminal" value. For i / ∈ A 1 we will construct b i iteratively.
For every k ≥ f , we will recursively define non-negative numbers t 1 i for all i ∈ J k − A 1 as follows. Suppose t 1 j have been defined for all j ∈ G k ≡ ∪
Since there are no dummy players, every i ∈ N − C belongs to at least one coalition in J , and has therefore been assigned a non-negative number, b i or t 1 i . It follows from (L.1) that for all i / ∈ A 1 , t 1 i ≤b.
If J 1 = ∅, terminate the algorithm, set b i = t 1 i for all i / ∈ A 1 and go to Step 3.
Suppose J 1 = ∅. Since J ∈ J 1 implies that |J| ≥ |J k | for all k < f and J ∈ J 1 , it follows from (L.1) that for every J ∈ J 1 , J − A 1 = ∅. Let J k 1 be a coalition in J 1 which maximizes
, ties being broken arbitrarily. For each i ∈ J k 1 − A 1 , set
Step 2: Since some of the components of the t vector have been increased, the remaining components may not be feasible. So, now repeat step 1 with A 2 replacing A 1 .
For k ≥ f , k = k 1 , we will recursively define t 2 i recursively as follows. Suppose
If J 2 is empty, terminate the algorithm with b i = t 2 i for all i ∈ N − (C ∪ A 2 ) and move to Step 3. Otherwise, choose the coalition J k 2 which maximizes
Suppose not. Since J k 2 ∈ J 2 , and by hypothesis,
. But this means that
other. By construction, b i > 0 for all i ∈ J 1 ∪ J 2 . This together with the fact that i∈J
Proof of Theorem 2.
We will construct a SREFS for two distinct cases. The first is the case, as in Example 7, where minimal winning coalitions consist of C and any one of the non-veto players. For the second case, in which there is at least one minimal winning coalition with two or more non-veto players, our construction will rely on Lemma 1 and Assumption 2.
Case 1: C ∪ {j} ∈ W for all j / ∈ C.
Let a > 0 and b > 0 be such that |C|a + |N − C|b = 1. Definex so that π(x) = N and
For every j / ∈ C, let X j be the set of all states x in which the winning coalition contains C ∪ {j} and the payoff vector has the property that u i (x) ≥ a for all i ∈ C, u j (x) = b and u k (x) = 0 for all k / ∈ C ∪ {j}.
We claim that Z = ∪ j / ∈C X j ∪ {x} is a SREFS: it is the set of stationary points of a strong rational expectation F satisfying the following properties.
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(1.1) For x ∈ Z, f (x) = x.
(1.2) For x ∈ X 0 , S(x) = N and f (x) =x.
The remainder of the rules for F relate to x ∈ X − Z − X 0 :
(1.4) For x such that u j (x) ≥ b for all j ∈ N − C, since x / ∈ Z, there must be a veto player i for whom u i (x) < a. Let {i } be the lowest indexed player of this kind. In this case we have S(x) = {i } and f (x) ∈ X 0 .
(1.5) For x such that u j (x) ≥ b for some non-veto player but not all, let j be the lowest indexed non-veto player such that u j (x) < b. There are now two distinct cases for describing F .
(1.5.b) Suppose s(x) ≤ 0. In this case, unlike the previous one, it is not possible to construct an objection that leads to Z in one step. However, it must be the case that there is a veto player i for whom u i (x) < a. Otherwise, s(x) = 0, which contradicts the supposition that x / ∈ Z. In this case, as in (4), S(x) = {i } and f (x) ∈ X 0 .
19 In what follows it will be understood that π(f (x)) is the immediate change in π(x) resulting from the formation of S(x), as formalized in Assumption 1 (b).
For x /
∈ Z, f * (x) =x in all cases except (1.5.a). It is easy to see that in every instance all the players in S(x) prefer f * (x) to x which means that F satisfies (E).
Since all non-veto players weakly preferx to any other state in Z, and a winning coalition coalition must include at least one such player, it follows that (M') is satisfied in case (1.2). The same reasoning applies to case (1.3). In case (1.4) player i cannot construct another farsighted objection as none of the non-veto players are interested in moving, which implies that this move is strongly maximal. In case (1.5.a) there is no state in Z that all the veto players prefer to f (x) and so (M') holds. Finally, in case (1.5.b) it is clear that player i cannot construct an objection leading to any other state in Z. Thus, in all cases (M') is satisfied.
To see that F satisfies (I), consider a possible farsighted move fromx that ends at some x ∈ X j . Since all non-veto players weakly preferx to x, none of them can be part of the first move from x. But then the first move must lead to a state in X 0 , which only results in returning tox, making it impossible for the initiating coalition to gain. Next, consider a move from x ∈ X j that ends up atx. Since all players in C ∪ {j} weakly prefer x tox, the first move must come from non-veto players other than j. But then Assumption 1 (c) on the effectivity correspondence implies that the payoff remains u(x) through the entire sequence of moves, contradicting the supposition that the state eventually becomesx. Finally, consider the possibility of a farsighted move that leads from x j ∈ X j to some x k ∈ X k , k = j. Again, by Assumption 1 (c), the first coalition in such a move cannot be from a coalition that is disjoint from C ∪ {j}. Moreover, such a coalition cannot include j, since j prefers x j to x k . It cannot include C since it's impossible for all i ∈ C to gain in moving from x j to x k . The only remaining possibility is that includes some strict subset of C. But that leads to a state in X 0 , from which the final outcome isx, not x k .
This completes the the proof of Case 1. . By Condition (3) of lemma 1, a ∈ (0, d).
Let S * = ∪ J∈J J, and let N * = C ∪ S * . Since C ∪ J is a winning coalition for every J ∈ J , clearly N * is a winning coalition.
DefineX to consist of all states x such that W (x) ⊇ N * and
Corresponding to each J k ∈ J , define X k as the set of states in which the winning coalition contains C ∪ J k and the payoff vector corresponding to x k ∈ X k is
LetX be the set of all (nonzero) states x such that
Of course, corresponding to every J k ∈ J , X k ⊆X. However,X may also include a state x with W (x) = C ∪ K and K / ∈ J because b K is not strictly positive.
We claim that Z =X ∪X is a SREFS.
To prove this we will construct a rational expectations function F with the following properties:
depending on the nature of π(x).
Note that if i ∈ T , then {i} ∈ A 1 as constructed in the proof of Lemma 1. Moreover, given that we are considering Case 2, A 1 also includes at least one coalition J such that |J| ≥ 2. This means that T is a strict subset of S * . It is also easy to see from the proof of Lemma 1 that J includes at least two distinct coalitions, which implies that |S * | ≥ 3.
To describe the transition from zero states, we partition X 0 into three disjoint sets. X 0 1 is the set of all zero states in which the coalition structure contains precisely one two-player coalition consisting of one player from C and the other from S * . X 0 2 is the set of zero states containing precisely two two-player coalitions: {i, j} and {i , k} such that i, i ∈ C, j ∈ T ⊂ S * and k ∈ S * − T . The set of all other zero states is denoted X 0 3 . For each k ∈ S * pick a unique J(k) ∈ J that contains k. The existence of such J(k) follows from Condition (1) of Lemma 1. With some abuse of notation, let X k refer to the set of states in which the winning coalition is C ∪ J(k), the payoff is d for all i ∈ C and b j for all j ∈ J(k).
We now provide a complete description of F .
1 , let (i, k) with i ∈ C and k ∈ S * be the unique two-player coalition of this form in π(x). Let S(x) = C ∪ J(k), and f (x) ∈ X k .
(2.4) For x ∈ X 0 2 , let (i, k) with i ∈ C and k ∈ S * − T be the unique pair of this form in π(x). Let S(x) = C ∪ J(k) and f (x) ∈ X k .
The remainder of the rules for F relate to x ∈ X − Z − X 0 .
(2.5) There is k ∈ S * such that u k (x) < b k and i ∈ C such that u i (x) < d.
There are three subcases to consider: (2.5.1) Either |C| = 2 or W (x) = C ∪ J where |J| ≥ 3.
Let H be the two-player coalition consisting of the lowest indexed player i ∈ C with u i (x) < d and the lowest indexed player k ∈ S * such that u k (x) < b k . Define S(x) = H. If H is a winning coalition, let f (x) ∈ X k . Otherwise, x = f (x) ∈ X 0 . Now, since |C| = 2 or |J| ≥ 3, invoking Assumption 1 (b), H is the unique coalition in π(x ) consisting of one player from C and another from S * . Thus, x ∈ X 0 1 and f (x ) ∈ X k with u i (f (x )) = d > u i (x) and
Thus, H has a farsighted objection to x that leads to a state in X k .
(2.5.2) |C| = 2 and W (x) = C ∪ J where |J| = 2.
Since |S * | ≥ 3 and |J| = 2, there exists k ∈ S * − J. Since k / ∈ W (x), u k (x) = 0. Without loss of generality, let k be the lowest indexed player in S * − J. Let S(x) = H = {i, k}. Clearly, for x = f (x), H is the unique coalition in π(x ) with one player from C and another from S * . Thus, x ∈ X 0 1 and, as in the previous paragraph, f * (x) ∈ X k . (2.5.3) |C| = 2 and W (x) = C ∪ {j} for some j ∈ T .
Recall that T is a strict subset of S * , i.e., there exists k ∈ S * − T . Of course k = j and u k (x) = 0 < b k . Let i be the lowest indexed player in C such that u i (x) < d and let S(x) = H = {i, k}. Note that x = f (x) ∈ X 0 2 , with H as the unique two-player coalition in π(x ) with one player from C and another from S * − T . This means that
Otherwise, by (2) of Lemma 1, u i (x) = d for all i ∈ C and u j (x) = b j for all j ∈ W (x) − C, which means that x ∈X, a contradiction to the hypothesis that x / ∈ Z. Let R be a minimal subset of R such that W (x) − R is not winning; i.e., W (x) − R is not winning but the addition of any single player, j, from R would make W (x) − (R − {j}) a winning coalition. By Assumption 2, this winning coalition cannot be of the form {i, j, k} where i is a veto player and j and k are non-veto players. This must mean that W (x) − R cannot consist of precisely one veto player and one non-veto player. Moreover, since W (x) − R / ∈ W, with S(x) = R , f (x) ∈ X 0 3 . (2.7) If x is such that u j (x) ≥ b j for all j ∈ S * , since x / ∈ Z, there must be a veto player i for whom u i (x) < a. Let {i } be the lowest indexed player of this kind and S(x) = {i }. Since |S * | ≥ 3, by Assumption 1 (b), f (x) ∈ X 0 3 . This completes the description of F . Note that in each case that x / ∈ Z, the expectation leads in at most two steps to a state in Z. It is also easy to see that all players in S(x) strictly gain in moving from x to f * (x). Thus F satisfies (E).
To show that F satisfies (M') it is useful to note that a non-veto player j ∈ N − C receives either b j or 0 in Z while a veto player i receives either a or d > a. In cases (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5), the move from x is initiated by a coalition of the form {i, k} with i ∈ C and k / ∈ C leading either directly or in two-steps to a state in X k . Since neither i nor k prefer any other state in Z, strong maximality holds in all these cases. In case (2.2), S(x) includes all non-veto players and every such j receives b j at f * (x) = f (x). Thus, none of them can do better as part of some other objecting coalition, implying that (M') is satisfied. The same argument also applies to case (2.6). In case (2.5), non-veto players have no reason to join any deviating coalition, and so any objection coalition must be a subset of C. Since |S * | ≥ 3, Assumption 1 (b) implies that non-veto players can only move to X 0 3 (and then toX). Thus, the move by {i } is strongly maximal.
Finally, we show that F satisfies (I).
Take anyx ∈X andx ∈X. Then, all i ∈ W (x) weakly preferx tox. So, if there is a farsighted objection fromx tox, and K is the first coalition to move, then K ⊆ N − W (x). From Assumption 1 (c) it follows that if K ∈ E(x, x), then u i (x) ≥ u i (x) for all i ∈ W (x). Repeated application of this argument rules out any farsighted objection. Notice that an identical argument ensures that there cannot be a farsighted objection from a state inX to another state inX. Obviously there cannot be a farsighted objection from a state inX to another state inX since the payoff vector for all states inX is unique.
Finally, consider the possibility of a farsighted objection fromx tox, wherex ∈X andx ∈X. All members of N − C weakly preferx tox. So, the first deviation must come from some subset of C. Since |S * | ≥ 3, Assumption 1 (b) implies that this leads to a state x in X 0 3 , and f (x) =x. This establishes that Z satisfies (I) and completes the proof that Z is a SREFS.
Proof of Theorem 4.
Suppose Z is a farsighted stable set. It is obvious that no players have the power to beneficially change a tyrannical allocation since one player has already captured the entire surplus. It must therefore belong to every farsighted stable set (as well as to every REFS). It is easy to see that allocations where two players get 0.5 are also stable in this sense. Thus, D 1 ⊆ Z.
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To complete the proof, we will now show that for every w / ∈ D 1 there is a farsighted objection that terminates in D 1 . There are two cases: (i) w / ∈ D 1 is such that w i = w j for all i, j such that w i > 0, w j > 0. This means that there are k players who receive 1/k, where k ≥ 3. Suppose two such players, say i and j, pillage a third and share the spoils equally. This increases the power of i and j. If there are any other players remaining with 1/k, then i and j pillage one such player in the next step. This process continues until we arrive at an allocation in D 1 where i and j get 0.5 each. This is clearly a farsighted objection.
(ii) There are i and j such that w i > w j > 0. Let i be a player such that w i ≥ w i for all i. Of course, i can pillage a player with lower wealth. This results in i becoming more powerful, and she can now pillage any other player j, with w j > 0, if there is any. Through this process of sequential pillaging, i can achieve the tyrannical allocation in which she has the entire wealth. This describes a farsighted objection, leading from w to a tyrannical allocation in D 1 .
Proof of Theorem 5.
20 The fact that the core is a subset of the farsighted core is a feature of pillage games. In general, it is possible that the core is disjoint from every farsighted stable set or REFS; recall Example 7.
We construct an expectation F as follows:
(i) Suppose w is such that w i > w j > 0 for some i, j. Let i be the lowest indexed player such that w i ≥ w i for all i, and let j be the lowest indexed player such that w j < w i . Then the expectation is that i will pillage j : f (w) = w where w i = w i + w j , w j = 0 and w k = w k for all k = i , j , and S(w) = {i }. Note that f * (w) is the tyrannical allocation where i gets the entire wealth.
(ii) Suppose w is such that all players with positive wealth have the same wealth but this is not 2 −k for any integer k. In other words, m players get 1/m but m = 2 k for any integer k. Letk be the largest k such that 2 k < m. Then f (w) ∈ Bk, and S(w) is the coalition consisting of the lowest indexed 2k players getting 1/m at w. Note that S(w) has the power to make this move since the total wealth of this coalition at w is We have constructed F such that Σ(F ) = B. It remains to be shown that F satisfies Conditions (I), (E) and (M').
Suppose F does not satisfy (I). Then there exists w ∈ B k and S ∈ E(w, w ) such that f * (w ) = w ∈ B k and w S w S . The last inequality implies that k < k.
First, suppose that w is such that w i > w j for some pair i, j. Then, w is a tyrannical allocation, so that |S| = 1. But, then S / ∈ E(w, w ) since w i = w j if w i , w j > 0.
So, w must satisfy w i = w j if w i , w j > 0. Also, since E satisfies equation (1), S = {i|w i > w i }. Putting these together, we must have w = w . That is, w ∈ B k .
Since w i > 0 implies that w i = 2 −k and w i > 0 implies that w i = 2 −k , this means that w i ≥ 2w i for i ∈ S -those with positive wealth at w must have at least twice as much as they did at w. Since the added wealth must have been pillaged, those who were pillaged must have had at least as much wealth at w as the pillagers. So,
This implies that S / ∈ E(w, w ).
To see that (E) is satisfied, consider w / ∈ B. If w is covered by Case (i), the only coalition that moves at each step is the singleton consisting of the lowest indexed player with the highest wealth at w. And, at each step, this coalition does better by eventually attaining the tyrannical allocation. Thus (E) holds for w in Case (i). For w covered by Case (ii), S(w) moves in one step to a stationary allocation which is an improvement since it involves equal sharing in a smaller coalition, and Condition (E) is therefore satisfied.
We now turn to Condition (M'). For w in Case (i) maximality is trivially satisfied since the singleton that moves ultimately achieves the tyrannical allocation. Suppose w is covered by Case (ii) and (M') is not satisfied. This means that there is a coalition T with T ∩ S(w) = ∅ that does better than f (w). Since all stationary allocations satisfy equal division among players We now check (M). In cases (ii) and (iv), each i ∈H(w) ends up getting 1 |H(w)| . There cannot be a better deviation. In case (iii), the agent initiating the deviation ends getting 1. Hence, (M) is satisfied.
Finally, it is easy to check that (E) is satisfied. In each of cases (ii) to (iv), S(w) has a farsighted objection culminating in some allocation in B(k * ).
